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ABSTRACT
Existing methods for active topology discovery within the IPv6 In-
ternet largely mirror those of IPv4. In light of the large and sparsely
populated address space, in conjunction with aggressive ICMPv6
rate limiting by routers, this work develops a different approach to
Internet-wide IPv6 topology mapping. We adopt randomized prob-
ing techniques in order to distribute probing load, minimize the
effects of rate limiting, and probe at higher rates. Second, we exten-
sively analyze the efficiency and efficacy of various IPv6 hitlists and
target generation methods when used for topology discovery, and
synthesize new target lists based on our empirical results to provide
both breadth (coverage across networks) and depth (to find poten-
tial subnetting). Employing our probing strategy, we discover more
than 1.3M IPv6 router interface addresses from a single vantage
point. Finally, we share our prober implementation, synthesized
target lists, and discovered IPv6 topology results.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As of August 2018, about 23% of Google’s users access their services
via IPv6 [30], while APNIC reports that ∼16k Autonomous Systems
(ASes) advertise IPv6 prefixes [34]. The number of IPv6 routes in
the BGP system has increased from ∼5k in 2011 to more than 56k
today [34], while native IPv6 adoption and traffic continues its ex-
ponential increase [15]. Similarly, a large content delivery network
ACMacknowledges that this contributionwas authored or co-authored by an employee,
contractor, or affiliate of the United States government. As such, the United States
government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this
article, or to allow others to do so, for government purposes only.
IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5619-0/18/10. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278559
(CDN) observed 1.72B unique native IPv6 addresses for 576 million
unique /64 prefixes on March 17, 2018 [50]. In a weeks’ time, the
number of IPv6 /64s covering active WWW clients approximated
the total number of globally routed IPv4 unicast addresses (∼2.5B).
These examples underscore the importance of IPv6 today, and the
need for accurate IPv6 topologies within the community.
Understanding the Internet’s IPv6 topology is important for ap-
plications ranging from improved content distribution and traffic
optimization, to better address anonymization [49] and reputa-
tion [12, 37], to enhanced network security [57, 59]. Despite these
compelling applications, three challenges remain: (i) an infeasibly
large address space that cannot be exhaustively scanned or uni-
formly sampled effectively, (ii) mandated and aggressive ICMPv6
rate limiting in routers [13], and (iii) unknown address allocation
policies and subnet structures. Note that the first two issues are
inter-related: attempting to increase coverage by probing more of
the IPv6 address space necessitates faster probing rates. However,
increasing the probing rate is self-defeating as doing so triggers
more rate limiting and, hence, fewer discovered router interfaces
and less representative topologies.
While decades of research have developed and refined active IPv4
topology discovery (e.g., [6, 20, 35, 38, 56], these techniques do not
address the aforementioned challenges unique to IPv6. Existing IPv6
topology mapping systems are thus forced to directly apply IPv4
discovery tools and techniques. For example, production CAIDA
and RIPE traceroutes regularly probe the ::1 address of every
global IPv6 BGP prefix [11, 52]. Because of this very sparse sampling
within the large IPv6 address space, the completeness and quality
of the resulting logical topologies is unknown.
In this work, we seek to advance the state-of-the-art in Internet-
wide IPv6 active topology mapping. Our methodology tackles two
fundamental aspects of the problem: (i) which addresses to target;
and (ii) how to probe.
First, we amass the largest collection of IPv6 target addresses/seeds
currently available from a variety of sources (e.g., BGP, DNS, CDNs
[22, 25, 49, 51, 54]) as well as generated seeds (e.g., 6Gen [46]). We
employ a three-step process to synthesize 12.4M target addresses
specifically crafted to promote topology discovery. Next, we per-
form a total of 45.8M traces from three vantages: two US universities
and one EU network. We investigate different target selection meth-
ods and parameters (e.g., maximum TTL, protocol, probing speed,
etc.) to find those that elicit the most IPv6 topological information.
We show that our methodology provides breadth across networks,
depth to discover subnetting, and speed. Employing our probing
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strategy, we discover >1.3M IPv6 router interface addresses from
a single vantage point in a single day – an order of magnitude
more than produced by current state-of-the-art mapping systems
that use hundreds of vantages in the same period. Our primary
contributions thus include:
• Evaluation of various means to synthesize target addresses from
seven different input seed sets.
• Quantification of random probing to maintain high rates while
avoiding ICMPv6 rate limiting.
• Characterization of target list power to yield topological results.
• IPv6 subnet discovery as a case study of topological inference.
• IPv6 router interface-level topology results, our synthesized
target lists, and our prober implementation [7].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides background on IPv6 topology mapping, while Section 3
characterizes the seed lists we utilize and describes our method for
synthesizing an IPv6 target set. We describe our probing in Sec-
tion 4, and provide results from an Internet-wide probing campaign
in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the results to infer likely subnet-
ting and better understand provider provisioning. We conclude in
Section 7 with a discussion of the security and privacy implications
of our work, as well as suggestions for continued research.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
IPv4 topology. Since the seminal Mercator [31] and Rocketfuel
work [56], themeasurement community hasmade continual progress
toward improving IPv4 topology discovery and inference (see e.g.,
[6, 35, 38] and references therein). Related to our initiative to design
a scalable active topology mapping system, Doubletree [20] begins
tracing from a midpoint on the path and halts when a trace reaches
a known, previously probed portion of the path. We examine Dou-
bletree’s performance for IPv6 in Section 4.2.
Recently, Beverly introduced Yarrp, a randomized high-speed
IPv4 topology prober [5]. In contrast to traditional traceroute tech-
niques intended to probe individual paths, Yarrp spreads topology
probes across the network rather than probing the path to each
individual destination sequentially. It does this by randomly permut-
ing the space of destination targets and TTLs, thereby attempting
to avoid overloading any single router or path. In addition, Yarrp
is stateless and can recover the necessary information to match
replies via carefully crafted probes. These properties allow Yarrp
to perform high-speed topology mapping. For instance, Yarrp has
been run at 100kpps to discover more than 400k unique IPv4 router
addresses in approximately 23 minutes [5].
Despite the significant body of prior work on IPv4 topology, IPv6
has at least two fundamental differences: a much larger address
space (that is sparsely populated) and aggressive ICMPv6 rate lim-
iting [13, 36]. We explore new techniques to accommodate both of
these properties in this work.
IPv6 topology. Dhamdhere et al. studied the evolution of IPv6
topology at the AS-level using passive BGP data and found that
fewer than 50% of AS-level paths in 2012 were identical between
IPv4 and IPv6, while a single AS (Hurricane Electric) appeared
in 20-95% of observed IPv6 AS paths [18]. Similarly, Czyz et al.
examined BGP tables in 2013 and, while they found only 19% of
ASes supporting IPv6, a k-core analysis showed that these ASes
were well-connected large networks with high centrality [15]. Com-
plementary to these efforts, we take an in-depth look at the IPv6
topology, starting from an interface-level perspective, after a period
of sustained growth, via active probing.
Presently, two production measurement platforms continually
perform active IPv6 topology mapping: CAIDA’s Ark [11] and RIPE
Atlas [52]. These systems send Paris [4] traceroute probes toward
the ::1 address in each IPv6 prefix present in the global BGP table.
Ark also probes a random address in each prefix. A central finding of
our work is that using BGP prefixes alone to guide target selection
works well to capture topological breadth, but not depth, i.e., it does
not discover subnetting.
Rohrer et al. uniformly sampled the IPv6 Internet in 2015 by
tracerouting to an address in every /48 prefix that makes up the
routed IPv6 address space [53]. Their study issued ten times as
many traces as our work, yet found an order of magnitude fewer
interfaces – demonstrating the necessity to perform finer-grained
probing within some prefixes to discover extant subnetting and the
routers supporting the subnets.
More broadly, prior studies of IPv6 topology use traditional tools
including traceroute6 [44] and scamper [41]. Gaston was the
first to explore higher-rate IPv6 active topology probing [28] via
randomization, and demonstrated the ability to capture roughly
an equivalent amount of topological information as collected via
CAIDA’s Ark system. However, Gaston’s study did not examine
the critical problem of target selection and rate-limiting, and did
not explore the ability to utilize high-speed probing to discover a
larger swath of the topology. Alvarez et al. developed and evalu-
ated methods to deal with ICMPv6 rate-limiting problems, but in a
stateful, proprietary prober [3].
Separate to interface-level topology discovery is finding aliases,
i.e., determining those interfaces that belong to the same physi-
cal router, and creating router-level graphs. Luckie et al. devel-
oped speedtrap, the first Internet-scale IPv6 alias resolution tech-
nique [42], now used to produce router-level graphs of the IPv6
Internet as part of CAIDA’s ITDK [10]. In this work, we focus on
IPv6 interface address discovery, and do not perform alias resolu-
tion. However, as alias resolution takes interface addresses as input,
the ability to discover IPv6 interfaces is directly beneficial [47].
IPv6 hitlists. Catalogs of active IPv6 addresses in the Internet,
commonly known as hitlists, have been of interest to the measure-
ment community over the last decade. Notable efforts leverage
active (e.g., random probing of ::1 [11], exhaustive probing of ::1
address in each /48 in all advertised /32s [53], and reverse DNS
zone walking [8, 22]) and passive techniques (e.g., from BGP up-
dates [18, 34] and from traffic captures [17]) as well as a number
of passive and active sources [25]. Similar to our effort, Gasser et
al. observe the propensity of IPv6 hitlists to contain clusters of
addresses [26]. While Gasser provides a new, aggregate IPv6 hitlist
that also removes aliased prefixes, they do not study how to adapt
the hitlist to IPv6 topology discovery. We provide details of the
specific hitlists we utilize in Section 3.1.
IPv6 addresses and deployments. Many issues pertinent to
our work – including address seed sources, target selection, and
probing techniques – reflect current understanding of IPv6 network
reconnaissance [29]. Malone analyzes different aspects of three IPv6
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Figure 1: IPv6 topology target generation: addresses from
various seeds are transformed into intermediate prefixes
which are then synthesized into targets.
address datasets and presents an analysis technique to learn about
their deployments and usages [44]. Czyz et al. [16] studied 520k and
25k dual-stacked servers and routers respectively and compared
the security policies of IPv4 and IPv6 deployments. To assess the
lifetime and density of IPv6 addresses, Plonka and Berger developed
Multi-Resolution Aggregate plots and classified billions of addresses
spatially and temporally [48]. A recursive algorithm to discover
and extract IPv6 addressing patterns is discussed in [58]. Similarly,
Foremski et al. proposed the Entropy/IP system to uncover the
structure of IPv6 addresses using machine learning [24]. In a like
vein, Murdock et al. designed “6Gen” target generation [46]. 6Gen
exploits address locality: discovery of new targets happens closer to
highly dense ranges. In a nybble, targets are generated either based
on a specific range (e.g., 2::[1-4]:0) or wildcard (e.g., 2::?:0);
the former is tight clustering while the latter is referred as loose.
3 TARGET SELECTION
Our methodology tackles two primary challenges: (i) selecting tar-
gets from the large and sparsely populated IPv6 address space; and
(ii) effectively probing. This section considers target selection.
3.1 Target Generation
We employ a three step process, outlined in Figure 1, to prepare
a set of targets, based on a set of intermediate prefixes, which are
synthesized from seeds. The targets are IP addresses to be used
as destinations for TTL-limited probes emitted from a vantage.
When discussing IPv6 addresses, we adopt the standard vernacular
of a subnet prefix to denote the high-order bits and the interface
identifier (IID) to denote the least significant 64 bits [33].
Step 1: Seed Sourcing. A list of seeds is obtained from a source.
Our seeds are either IP prefixes (base address and length) or IPv6
addresses (base address with implicit 128bit length), which are used
as hints to select interesting areas of the address space that help
define probe destinations.
Step 2: Prefix Transformation. One or more transformations
may be applied to the seeds to yield a set of intermediate prefixes.
Depending on the transformation method, the resulting set might
have the same or fewer number of prefixes than the seed list to
which it was applied. The prefix transformations we use are:
• kn: Perform kIP aggregation-based address anomymization
with parameters:w = 14 (window days), i = 1 (interval hours),
k = n (simultaneously-assigned /64 prefixes), p = 50 (50th
percentile of intervals). [49], e.g., k32 and k256 [49].
• zn: Extend input prefixes with length < n to /n, i.e., base address
set to zeroes after the nth bit; aggregate input prefixes having
length > n to /n prefixes.
Step 3: Target Synthesis. Lastly, a synthesis method takes the
intermediate prefixes as input and yields a set of target addresses.
The target synthesis methods used in this study are as follows:
• lowbyte1: bitwise OR prefix base address with IID value
:0000:0000:0000:0001.
• fixediid: bitwise OR prefix base address with IID value
:1234:5678:1234:5678.
For each, we remove duplicate addresses within the set. The target
address sets are then ready to be employed in a probe campaign.
3.2 Seeds
The seed sources used in this study are as follows:
• caida: The set of probe targets selected by CAIDA, based on
BGP-advertised IPv6 prefixes of size /48 or larger, i.e., prefixes
with length of at most 48 bits [11].
• fiebig: The set of IPv6 addresses gleaned from walking the
ip6.arpa zones in the DNS [22].
• fdns_any: A set of IPv6 addresses found in DNS answers in
response to forward DNS ANY queries performed by Rapid7’s
Project Sonar [51].
• dnsdb: A set of IPv6 addresses found in DNS answers passively
observed in AAAA DNS query responses by Farsight Security’s
Farsight Passive DNS project, anonymized and imported into
Farsight DNSDB [54]. We queried DNSDB for all IPv6 records
observed between 15 Feb and 28 Apr 2018 in the covering set of
all advertised BGP IPv6 prefixes (as reported by RouteViews [1]
on 20 Apr 2018).
• cdn: A set of IPv6 prefixes, having various lengths, that are
anonymized aggregates [49] covering WWW client IPv6 ad-
dresses believed to be SLAAC temporary privacy addresses
(the most common type of WWW client addresses [48]), as
observed by a large Content Delivery Network (CDN) across
14 days, February 18, 2018 through March 3, 2018 (UTC).
• 6gen: A set of IPv6 address synthesized using the 6Gen tool in
loose clustering mode [46]. The input to the tool is a combina-
tion of IPv6 destinations probed and new interfaces found from
probing those destinations by CAIDA on March 06, 2018.
• tum: A combined set of IPv6 addresses created by combining
multiple existing address sets including some that we also use
individually (fdns_any) and a number of others (openipmap,
ct, caida-dnsnames, alexa-country, traceroute, and traceoute-
v6-builtin). Some of these subsets are documented in [25] and
others are undocumented. Each subset is packaged separately,
and we noted some anomalies (such as zero-size of very small
files for recent dates) leaving room for interpretation as to what
would best represent the TUM dataset as a whole. With this in
mind we took the most recent and largest file for each subset,
which are shown in Table 2.
We examine several features of our seed lists in Table 1. At a glance
we note the wide variance in size (105k addresses to 25M). The seeds
are derived using widely varying methodologies, which we hope
makes them complementary (not redundant). We also perform a
simple classification of the IIDs in order to inform our choice of
target IID, as well as enable correlation with result sets.
We classified our seed addresses using the addr6 tool [55]. This
tool examines each address, looking for patterns, such as whether
the IID, e.g., (i) may be an EUI-64 IID with an embedded MAC
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Table 1: Seed List Properties
Name Method Date # Addrs Interface Identifiers (IIDs)yyyy/mm/dd Random LowByte EUI-64
CAIDA [11] BGP-derived 2018/05/09 105.2k 53.7k 51.02% 51.5k 48.98% 0 0.00%
DNSDB [54] Passive DNS 2018/02/15 – 2018/04/28 5.4M 1.3M 24.43% 2.2M 41.27% 146.5k 2.74%
Fiebig [22] Reverse DNS 2018/03/27 11.7M 4.2M 35.94% 3.2M 27.54% 275.4k 2.35%
FDNS [51] Fwd. DNS 2018/04/27 24.8M 3.3M 13.12% 7.0M 28.20% 236.8k 0.95%
CDN Clients[49] kIP anonymization: k = 256 2018/02/18 – 2018/03/03 N/A All 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
kIP anonymization: k = 32 2018/02/18 – 2018/03/03 N/A All 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
6gen [46] Generative 2018/03/13 4.9M 4.4M 89.61% 389.2k 7.93% 17.1k 0.35%
Combined Join Sets varies 50.8M 13.2M 28.19% 12.9M 27.45% 675.8k 1.44%
TUM [25] Collection varies 5.6M 2.3M 44.62% 1.2M 23.54% 604.0k 11.79%
Random Random 2018/05/23 26.5M 0 0.0% 95.8k 0.36% 0 0.0%
Table 2: TUM Seed Subsets
Filename # Addresses
alexa-country-2018-04-23.csv 1,634
caida-dnsnames-2018-01-17.csv 1,268,982
caida-dnsnames-2018-04-25.csv 16,507
ct-2018-04-27.csv 21,983,387
openipmap-2018-04-23.txt 11,149
rapid7-dnsany-2018-03-30.csv 24,959,477
rapid7-dnsany-2018-03-31.csv 14,434,117
traceroute-2018-04-24.txt 128,398
traceroute-v6-builtin-2018-02-25.txt 112,754
All zone files from 2018-04-27 17,173,243
Total 80,089,648
Total Unique 5,599,313
address, (ii) has a run of zeroes followed only by a low number
(“lowbyte”), or (iii) has no discernible pattern (“randomized”, essen-
tially meaning unrecognized). In Table 1, the percentages reflect
the proportion within each seed list (row).
The CDN clients’ individual IPv6 addresses were not provided
to the authors in order to maintain privacy; instead, the authors re-
ceived and utilized anonymized prefixes that were generated using
the kIP aggregation approach as mentioned in Section 3.1. While
the number of addresses aggregated is undisclosed, there were
421,807 aggregates (prefixes) in the CDN-k256 set and 3,445,329
in the CDN-k32 set. We treat the first six seed lists in Table 1 as
independent. We create our own combined list by joining those six
lists. The TUM list is also a collection [25], which includes CAIDA
and FDNS subsets, and therefore is not independent of the first six
lists. Lastly, we randomly generate 26.5M targets in BGP routed
IPv6 address space as a control seed list.
3.3 Selecting Transformations
Prefix transformation granularity.Next, we seek to understand
the influence of aggregation granularity when performing prefix
transformation. Many of our seed input datasets contain multi-
ple IPv6 addresses within the same /64 prefix – this is a natural
consequence of their intended use as hitlists for IPv6 host discov-
ery, rather than IPv6 router discovery. Intuitively, assuming that
/64 prefixes are allocated to LANs or Internet service subscribers
as the smallest common IPv6 subnets, we would not typically ex-
pect traceroutes to multiple addresses within the same /64 to yield
different topologies.
Table 3: ICMPv6 Trial Results by Transformation
zn Probes Other ICMPv6 Addrs Excl Addrs
/40 1.4M 17.5k 27.0k 158
/48 3.6M 105.8k 45.5k 321
/56 6.1M 194.8k 60.5k 1.1k
/64 11.8M 486.8k 85.5k 27.2k
To characterize the relationship to the discovered topology, and
the probing requiredwhen using our zn transformation, wemounted
a trial campaign that probed the fdns_any dataset for varying val-
ues of n. Table 3 shows that z64 requires more than eight times
as many probes as z40, but discovers three times as many unique
interfaces. More importantly, we consider the number of interfaces
that are discovered exclusively as a result of using a particular
transformation level. Although z64 requires significant probing,
there are more than 27k interfaces that were only discovered when
using this transformation level. Finally, we examine the number
of non-“Time Exceeded” responses from each of the levels. The
fraction of other ICMPv6 responses per probe is 0.012, 0.029, 0.032,
and 0.041 for n = 40, 48, 56, 64, respectively. Thus, after normalizing
to the number of probes, the n = 64 transformation level has the
effect of producing a higher rate of non-“Time exceeded” responses,
suggesting that these probes are reaching deeper into networks.
Target synthesis. The lower 64 bits of an IPv6 address denote
the interface identifier (IID) [33]. Given a candidate prefix, we must
select an IID within that prefix to probe. Natural candidates are
the IID ::1, a random IID, an IID occurring in the input seed list,
or a (optionally fixed) pseudo-random identifier. In addition to
understanding whether this choice has an impact on topological
discovery, we further wish to expose the extent to which different
identifiers elicit non-“Time Exceeded” messages as a metric of im-
pact on hosts. We therefore mounted two trial campaigns using the
cdn-k256 prefixes, the z64 transformation, and both the (a) low-
byte1 and (b) fixediid host identifiers for target synthesis. Table 4
shows the distribution of ICMPv6 Time Exceeded and Destination
Unreachable responses received as a result of the campaigns.
First, we find that more than 98% of responses are ICMPv6 time
exceeded messages as we expect. We see only negligible differences
between lowbyte1 and fixediid; lowbyte1 produces five times as
many ICMPv6 port unreachable responses, but the total number of
such responses is still very small. Second, to understand the use of a
known address within the prefix, we further compare against probes
toward known addresses within the Fiebig seed list (not shown).
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Table 4: ICMPv6 Trial Results by IID
type/code CDN-k256 z64 Fiebiglowbyte1 fixediid known
Time Exceeded 98.1% 98.1% 95.8%
no route to destination 0.7% 0.7% 0.6%
administratively prohibited 0.6% 0.6% 0.4%
address unreachable 0.3% 0.4% 0.7%
port unreachable 0.1% 0.0% 2.3%
reject route to destination 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
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Figure 2: Features contributed by each target set
In contrast to probing the ::1 or fixed, these port unreachable
messages constitute 2.3% of the distribution for the known address
probing, suggesting that our probing is reaching end hosts.
Because we observe only minimal impact on discovery between
fixed IID and the ::1 IID (a response rate difference of less than
2%), we choose to use the fixed identifier for the remainder of the
experiments in order tominimize any potential impacts from probes
reaching end hosts.
3.4 Target Set Characterization
After generating our target sets as in Section 3.1 and Figure 1,
we characterize and compare them across multiple dimensions in
Table 5. Unique targets refers to the number of targets in the set
after duplicates have been removed. Exclusive (Excl) features are
those found only in one of the sets and not any other set. We find
that most of the sets have some fraction of targets that are not
found in the public BGP IPv6 routing tables, and in some cases
(e.g., Fiebig) this fraction is significant, so the “Routed Targets” and
“Exclusive Routed Targs” columns characterize only the subset of
targets that appear in BGP. Additionally we note that some target
sets, despite a large number of targets, are concentrated in only a
few BGP prefixes and ASNs, based on the number of BGP prefixes
and ASN represented in each set.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, some seed lists, and consequently
the corresponding target sets, are not independent of others. When
computing features that are exclusive to any of the first 14 sets listed
in Table 5 (CAIDA through 6Gen), we do not consider the Combined
or TUM sets, since they would mask the exclusive contributions of
their respective subsets. For the TUM sets, however, we do show
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(b) DPL distribution when sets are considered together
Figure 3: Discriminating Prefix Length (DPL) Distributions
for target sets (CDF)
the features that are found in that set exclusively. The Combined
and Total sets appear here merely to show the total number of
unique features that exist across all sets; they are not independently
probed as their own campaigns.
Figure 2 shows the features contributed exclusively by each z64
target set. Clearly there are a few large players in terms of number
of targets/routed targets, however this does not strongly correlate
to representation in BGP prefixes (Pfx) or ASNs. Since the vast
majority of prefixes and ASNs are represented in more than one
target set, we provide an alternate inset view of those two features
with the shared contribution removed. From this we can see the
lack of correlation between target set size and those BGP features.
3.4.1 Discriminating Power. In this work we rely heavily on the
notion of address’ discriminating prefix length (DPL).1 An address’
DPL is the first (leftmost) bit at which it differs from its nearest
address accompanying it in a (sorted) set, e.g., one of our target sets.
From left to right (high to low order) bits across the address, the DPL
is how far one must compare addresses, bit by bit, to discriminate
them from each other, for instance how a primitive router might
determine which way to forward traffic if two addresses required
1Kohler et al. [39] introduced the term “discriminating prefix length.” It has been
employed in the structure analysis of both active and passive measurements.
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Table 5: Target Set Properties
Name Agg Unique Exclusive Routed Exclusive BGP Exclusive ASNs Exclusive 6to4Targets Targets Targets Routed Targs Prefixes BGP ASNs
CAIDA z48 78.3k 26.4k 76.2k 25.4k 47.5k 1.4k 14.4k 254 0z64 105.2k 56.6k 102.7k 55.2k 47.6k 1.4k 14.4k 254 0
DNSDB z48 93.8k 9.3k 93.3k 9.4k 36.5k 360 12.8k 73 80z64 233.0k 101.1k 231.9k 101.0k 36.7k 442 12.8k 72 80
Fiebig z48 102.2k 85.4k 45.1k 28.8k 6.0k 8 3.9k 2 0z64 1.0M 898.7k 576.9k 468.8k 6.0k 11 3.9k 2 0
FDNS z48 228.7k 171.8k 193.0k 136.7k 13.4k 17 7.7k 5 88.4kz64 746.9k 566.3k 709.9k 530.4k 13.5k 34 7.7k 6 88.5k
CDN-k256 z48 162.4k 2.6k 162.3k 2.6k 3.3k 0 589 0 160z64 396.7k 19.6k 396.6k 19.5k 3.3k 0 589 0 160
CDN-k32 z48 524.2k 341.8k 523.9k 341.6k 4.9k 3 1.2k 0 1.4kz64 3.2M 2.8M 3.2M 2.8M 4.9k 4 1.2k 0 1.4k
6Gen z48 1.4M 1.4M 1.3M 1.3M 44.3k 171 13.8k 17 0z64 4.5M 4.4M 4.3M 4.2M 44.5k 287 13.8k 18 0
Combined z48 2.3M N/A 2.1M N/A 48.3k N/A 14.5k N/A 89.9kz64 9.5M N/A 8.8M N/A 48.6k N/A 14.5k N/A 90.0k
TUM z48 362.7k 108.4k 305.3k 86.0k 25.6k 36 10.9k 10 91.0kz64 2.1M 1.3M 2.0M 1.3M 25.9k 158 10.9k 20 91.2k
Total
z48 2.4M N/A 2.2M N/A 48.3k N/A 14.5k N/A 100.7k
z64 10.8M N/A 10.1M N/A 48.8k N/A 14.5k N/A 100.9k
both 12.4M N/A 11.5M N/A 48.8k N/A 14.5k N/A 114.9k
different treatment. As such, the DPLs of addresses in a set capture
their proximity to each other – the higher the DPLs the closer
the addresses are – and, when two addresses are topologically
heterogeneous, e.g., in different subnets, the addresses’ DPL is a
lower bound on their respective subnets’ prefix length. We will first
employ DPL to characterize our target sets. Later, in Section 6, we
use DPL when discovering network topology from trace results.
Figure 3a explores the potential power of each target set to
discriminate addresses and subnets, on its own. Note how the dis-
tribution of discriminating prefix lengths characterizes a target set.
For instance, about 50% of the caida-z64 target addresses have a
DPL less than 48, i.e., they do not share the same top 48 bits, and
therefore are not covered by the same /48 prefix. In contrast, over
70% of the fiebig-z64 target addresses have DPL of 64, meaning
the addresses share the top 63 bits, i.e., are very near one another.
Figure 3b explores the increased potential discriminating power
that each target set brings when they are used in combination.
For example, the caida-z64 distribution shifts right, meaning that
some addresses from other target sets are interleaved amongst its
target addresses, thus yielding more power to discover router hops
on paths to more (specific) routed prefixes or subnets. One might
say addresses in some target sets cleave apart addresses in others,
yielding a more powerful combined target set in depth as well
as breadth. In contrast, note that the distribution of fiebig-z64
is unaffected by the combination. This is largely because it has
densely-arranged target addresses, 89% of which are unique (see
Table 5) and are not interleaved with those of other target sets.
Note Figure 3b allows us to make predictions about the discrimi-
nating power of the target sets in combination with each other as
measured by a shift rightward to higher DPL values. For instance,
cdn-k256,z64 when combined with cdn-k32,z64 discriminating
power shifts to that of latter, which happens to contain 94% of the
targets in the former. Also, combining fdns_any-z64with tum-z64
converge to similar discriminating power. Presumably this is a side-
effect of the latter largely including the former. Indeed, 88% of the
targets in fdns_any-z64 are contained in tum-z64. Additionally,
dnsdb-z64 roughly converges with tum-z64 and fdns_any-z64.
Given the latter is also DNS-based, it is plausible that it explores
some some common address space.
Also noteworthy is what does not change between Figures 3a
and 3b. None of the “large” target sets (cdn-k32,z64; 6gen-z64;
or tum-z64) shift noticeably to the right. From this we draw two
insights. First, combining significantly smaller sets with large sets
has no significant impact on the potential discriminating power of
the large set (unsurprisingly), even when significant interleaving
occurs. Second, none of our large sets interleave significantly with
each other. This is both good and bad, meaning that they are com-
plementary in terms of the regions of IPv6 space explored, with
the tradeoff being that they do not reinforce one another to enable
addition depth of topology discrimination. If two similarly sized
and interleaved target sets were combined, we would expect the
combined potential discriminating power to be higher than either
set individually.
To reiterate, at this stage we are only discussing potential dis-
criminating power because these are only target sets; they are not
empirically discovered. While some target sets capture prefixes of
real hosts, others are synthetically generated.
4 PROBING
We start with Yelling at Random Routers Progressively (Yarrp),
a randomized high-speed IPv4 topology prober [5]. Rather than
maintaining large amounts of state, as randomization imposes on
a traditional traceroute-based prober, Yarrp encodes details of the
probe (e.g., originating TTL and timestamp) within the packet so
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Figure 4: Yarrp6 state: a 12B application payload carries state
and corrects the checksum such that the IPv6 and transport
headers remain per-target constant.
that state can be reconstructed from the ICMP reply. This encoding
thus allows Yarrp to be stateless. Yarrp thus decouples probing
from topology construction; the complete set of responses to any
single destination are not in any order and are intermixed with the
responses from all other destinations. Based on promising results
measuring IPv4 [5], we explore adapting these techniques to the
IPv6 domain which has both a much larger and sparsely populated
address space, as well as mandated ICMPv6 rate limiting.
4.1 Yarrp6
State encoding. IPv6 requires several changes in order to retain
the stateless nature of Yarrp. First, IPv6 headers have removed
some of the fields used by Yarrp in IPv4 to encode state, e.g., IPID.
While there is less room for encoding within the IPv6 packet header,
conversely, ICMPv6 affords the advantage of complete packet quo-
tations. Rather than having to encode state into the probe’s packet
headers such that a partial (28 bytes, 28B) packet quotation con-
tains Yarrp state, the ICMPv6 specification requires as much of the
packet that induced the “Time Exceeded” message to be returned
as possible [13]. This allows us to encode and recover more state
(than with IPv4) and ensures that header values remain constant
so all probes for the same destination follow the same path when
load balancing is present [4]. Further, placing state in the payload
removes the need to encode data within the transport protocol
(for example, IPv4 Yarrp uses the TCP sequence number to encode
the timestamp), and thus easily facilitates using multiple transport
protocols (Yarrp6 supports TCP, UDP, and ICMPv6).
Figure 4 depicts Yarrp6 state encoding within the probes it sends.
After the IPv6 and transport headers is the Yarrp6 payload of 12B.
The Yarrp6 payload consists of a 4B magic number and 1B instance
ID to ensure that received ICMPv6 packets are indeed responses to
Yarrp6 probes, and for the running instance. A single byte encodes
the originating TTL (“hop limit”). Four bytes encode the probe’s
timestamp to permit round-trip-time (RTT) computation.
Similar to IPv4 paths, Almeida et al. find load balancing preva-
lent on IPv6 paths they sample [2]. We therefore wish to ensure
that the packet headers remain constant and accommodate load
balanced paths, however the transport checksum will be differ-
ent for each probe as the TTL and timestamp in the Yarrp6 pay-
load changes. While the transport checksum is not typically used
for load-balancing TCP and UDP flows, the ICMPv6 checksum
is employed in per-flow load balancing. We therefore include 2B
of “fudge” within the Yarrp6 payload in order to ensure that the
transport checksum also remains constant. Finally, we compute a
2B Internet checksum over the IPv6 target address and, depend-
ing on the transport protocol selected, use it for the TCP or UDP
source port or ICMPv6 identifier. This checksum permits detection
of modifications to the IPv6 target address, e.g., due to middleboxes.
Fill Mode. A consequence of stateless operation is that Yarrp
cannot stop probing when it reaches its destination, or encounters
several unresponsive hops in a row (the so-called “gap-limit”) [5].
Instead, the user must select the probe TTL range a priori, poten-
tially missing hops if the maximum TTL is smaller than the path
length, or wasting probes if the maximum TTL is too large. To
accommodate this tension, we add to Yarrp6 a “fill mode.”
Let the user-selected, initial maximum probing TTL be m. In
fill mode, if Yarrp6 receives a response for a probe sent with hop
limit h where h ≥ m, it immediately sends a new probe toward the
destination with a hop limit of h + 1. While these additional probes
are not randomized, fills are uncommon and occur at the tail of the
path where the effect of sequential probing has the least impact.
We explore tuning of Yarrp6 parameters, including fill mode, next.
4.2 Tuning
In addition to selecting vantage points and targets, active topology
discovery requires choosing the probing protocol, maximum TTL,
speed, and other parameters. This section explores these parameters
to better understand the tradeoffs and to guide our probing strategy.
An evaluation metric we employ is the number of discovered
“interface addresses.” Henceforth, we define an interface address
to be a unique IPv6 source address of received ICMPv6 messages,
and do not attempt to correlate these with interfaces or among
routers. In particular, a packet forwarder (e.g., router) has multiple
interfaces, including virtual loopbacks, and each interface can have
multiple addresses. While [13] specifies that nodes should choose a
unicast IPv6 source address for ICMPv6 packets according to the
packet’s destination, other behaviors may exist.
Protocol. Any IPv6 packet can be used for active topology prob-
ing, however the well-known prevalence of middleboxes and fire-
walls suggests that different packet types, e.g., TCP SYN, TCP ACK,
UDP, or ICMPv6, can yield different results depending on whether
these are blocked along a path or whether an in-path device main-
tains connection state. Luckie et al. studied the influence of trans-
port protocol for IPv4 and found that ICMP-Paris reaches the most
destinations, while UDP based methods infer the greatest number of
IP links [43]. CAIDA’s production active topology discovery [9, 11]
utilizes ICMP-Paris for both IPv4 and IPv6.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no published equivalent
analysis of the effect of transport protocol on IPv6 active topology
discovery. We therefore mounted trial probe campaigns from two
of our vantage points on February 1, 2018 using the CAIDA target
set. We use the same permutation seed and targets to probe using
TCP, UDP, and ICMPv6. To mitigate the possible effects of any
rate-limiting, we probed at only 20pps.
On average, we see that probing with ICMPv6 results in ∼2.2%
and 2.1% more discovered interface addresses than using UDP and
TCP respectively. Interestingly, ICMPv6 probes produce on average
13.6% and 24.3% more non-“Time Exceeded” ICMPv6 responses
than UDP and TCP respectively, suggesting that these probes are
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Figure 5: Trial Results: Relationship between probing strategy, rate, and per-hop responsiveness at two vantage points. While
ICMPv6 rate-limiting is clearly evident, randomly permuting the probing order universally improves responsiveness.
penetrating deeper into the network. Given these observations, we
send ICMPv6 probes for the remaining experiments.
Speed. As discussed previously, probing speed has a potentially
greater impact on discovery in IPv6 as compared to IPv4 due to man-
dated rate-limiting. Toward understanding the behavior of various
probing techniques and speeds, we mount trial probing campaigns
to the CAIDA target set on April 27, 2018 from our vantage points.
Figure 5 shows the per-trace fraction of responses received as a
function of responding IPv6 hop for speeds of 20, 1000, and 2000 pps,
and using two probing strategies: randomized (as implemented in
Yarrp6) and sequential (as implemented in scamper [41]). Scamper
running in ICMPv6 Paris mode represents the current state-of-the-
art topology probing tool and technique used in production systems.
Note that because the number of responsive interface addresses de-
creases as the hop distance increases, it is necessary to compare the
relative performance of Yarrp6 and sequential at different speeds.
We observe markedly different results between sequential and
Yarrp6 at speeds above 20pps, especially nearer to the vantage point.
For instance, in Figure 5a, while sequential and Yarrp6 have nearly
identical response rates at 20pps, Yarrp6 yields a 100% response
rate from the first hop for 1000 and 2000pps as compared to less
than 20% and 10% for sequential. Across both vantage points, we
observe better performance with Yarrp6 at all hops than achieved
with sequential at higher probing rates.
Investigation of timing from packet captures of the two tools
shows per-TTL bursty behavior in the sequential prober imple-
mentation, a behavior that persists as traces remain synchronized.
In addition to Yarrp’s randomization strategy, the rate-limiting ef-
fects could also possibly be mitigated with a different transmission
behavior, an observation recently made in [3].
Also of note are the variety of rate-limiting behaviors imple-
mented by routers. For instance, hop 3 of Figure 5a and hops 5 and
9 of Figure 5b appear to implement more aggressive rate limiting
as compared to the other hops. Further, while not pictured, we find
one hop near one of our vantage points that only responds with
time exceeded messages when ICMPv6 is used as the probe type.
Because subsequent hops respond, we conjecture that this behavior
is due to some form of state maintenance for security reasons.
Probe order.While sequentially increasing TTL tracing clearly
induces ICMPv6 rate limiting, there are a variety of potential probe
order strategies that can help mitigate the effects of rate limiting,
including Yarrp6’s randomization. Since we first observed the ef-
fects of ICMPv6 rate limiting on active topology scans [27], other
researchers have recently reported similar findings and explored
different probing strategies [3].
The tree-like structure of the network implies that hops clos-
est to the vantage will experience the most probing traffic, and
it follows that we observe these nearby hops exhibiting the most
rate-limiting. Thus, a natural strategy to explore is Doubletree [20]
which first observed that paths exhibit significant redundancy in
their initial hops. Doubletree chooses an intermediate starting TTL
and probes forward (increasing TTL) and backward (decreasing
TTL) until it receives a response from an interface it has previously
observed. Doubletree then fills in missing portions of the path based
on previous results.
To better understandDoubletree’s performance relative to ICMPv6
rate limiting, as a trial, we also probe the CAIDA target set from
our vantage points at various packet rates using scamper’s Double-
tree implementation. While Doubletree induces less rate limiting
than traditional traceroute methods, we observe an unexpected
effect: when rate limiting causes a hop to be non-responsive, Dou-
bletree continues probing backward in the TTL space. Thus, as the
token buckets on the initial hops drain, Doubletree continues to
probe them, causing them to remain empty. Notwithstanding this
behavior, Doubletree has two fundamental limitations. First, it is
necessary to select the intermediate starting TTL, a parameter that
must be heuristically estimated and set for each vantage point. Sec-
ond, using results from previous traces to fill in hops that were not
probed can lead to erroneous path inference, either due to violations
of destination based routing, as described in [23] or path changes.
We therefore believe that Yarrp6 provides a compromise between
completeness and scalability that is well-suited to Internet-wide
IPv6 topology studies.
Finally, we note that Yarrp also includes the ability to employ a
similar heuristic as Doubletree where it can maintain state over its
local responsive neighborhood (e.g., router interface hops below a
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Table 6: Fill Mode Trial Results
MaxTTL Probes Fills Int Addrs Yield %
4 375.6k 96.4k 271 0.1
8 751.2k 213.5k 11.3k 1.2
16 1.5M 251.5k 39.1k 2.2
32 3.0M 0 54.1k 1.8
configurable TTL). In this mode, Yarrp maintains a per-TTL times-
tamp of the last time a probe was sent and the last time a probe
elicited a new interface address. If no new addresses are discovered
within a configurable window of time, Yarrp skips future probes
for that TTL. While this work purposefully takes an exhaustive
stateless approach, in future research we plan to experiment with
Yarrp6’s neighborhood enhancement.
TTL range. As described previously, Yarrp6’s fill mode balances
the choice of a maximum probe TTL with discovery rate and vol-
ume of probing. Recall that the maximum TTL must be selected in
advance as part of the permutation process. Thus, a large maximum
TTL will potentially waste probes, while a small maximum TTL
will potentially miss hops. Fill mode allows us to select a lower
maximum TTL, thereby lowering probing volume, while missing
fewer hops.
To quantify this tradeoff, we explore the use of different Yarrp6
maximum TTL values in a final set of trials probing the CAIDA
target set onMay 2, 2018. In these trials, fill mode continues probing
past the maximum TTL so long as responses are received, up to
a maximum hop limit of 32. Table 6 shows the number of probes,
probes resulting from fills, unique interface addresses discovered,
and the interface address yield (addresses discovered per probe).
Note that a single non-responsive hop past the maximum TTL will
cause fill mode to stop. Thus, we observe that the number of fills for
a maximum TTL of four is much less than for a maximum TTL of
eight simply because hop five did not respond. Using a maximum
TTL of 16 produces the highest yield; we therefore use this for all
subsequent campaigns (i.e., results in Section 5) in order to achieve
the most efficient use of probing.
4.3 Ethical Considerations
Performing large-scale, Internet-wide activemeasurements requires
careful consideration of the experimental methodology to avoid
causing harm. First and foremost, we obtained explicit permission
from the networks hosting the vantage points in our study. Second,
we opt to send ICMPv6 probes as they are relatively innocuous
compared to UDP and TCP, are used by the existing Ark and RIPE
platforms thereby facilitating direct comparison, and yield the most
responses as discussed in Section 4.2. Third, although capable of
much higher rates, we run Yarrp6 at 1kpps both to minimize rate-
limiting (Section 4.2) and to maintain low network load. (Note that
Yarrp’s randomization naturally spreads load.) Fourth, because our
goal is to discover IPv6 router addresses, not end hosts, we use the
fixed pseudo-random IID for all campaigns, which is unlikely to be
that of an active IPv6 host. We show in Section 3.3 that using this
IID has negligible effect on topology discovery as compared to the
::1 IID.
Finally, we follow best practices for good Internet citizenship by
making an informative web page, along with opt-out instructions,
available at the source address of our probes [21]. Over the course
of our probing campaigns, we received two opt-out requests with
which we immediately complied.
5 RESULTS
We present the following results: (i) an analysis of the power of the
target sets to yield interface addresses in Yarrp6 campaigns; (ii) com-
parisons of Yarrp6 results to other probers performing similar and
different trace campaigns; (iii) detailed results of high-frequency
Yarrp6 campaigns launched from three vantage machines each with
18 different target sets (54 in total) on May 14, 2018 and summarized
in Figure 6 and Table 7. The top line in the table is the combined
result across all three vantages and all campaigns per vantage.
5.1 Topology
In terms of overall discovery, the two best performing target sets
are cdn-k32 and tum. Not only do they produce the largest abso-
lute numbers of interfaces, they continue to reveal new addresses
throughout the entire probing duration. As shown in Table 7, they
are largely complementary and contribute the two largest shares
of interfaces exclusively discovered by single target sets.
Figure 6 lets us compare the fraction of total traces performed
for each target set by features of the router addresses discovered as
a result of those traces. In the small axes on the right of the figure,
we isolate just the fraction of exclusive BGP prefixes, and exclusive
ASNs for each set, since that is obscured by the shared portion on
the main figure.
Rightmost in Table 7, as with the seeds in Section 3, we used
addr6 to classify the resulting interface addresses discovered across
all trace campaigns. Surprisingly, we find many EUI-64 addresses,
651.4k or 45% of all interface addresses. These are labeled “EUI-64:
Int Addrs” in Table 7, most prominently yielded by the tum (53%
EUI-64 results) and cdn-k32 (39% EUI-64 results) campaigns. The
accompanying percentage shows the proportion of EUI-64 interface
addresses within each campaign. Of these EUI-64 router addresses,
59% are from one of just two manufacturers; 99.9% of each of those
address are in just two ISP networks, each in different countries. In
both cases, WWW content suggests they are Customer Premises
Equipment (CPE) routers in ostensibly large, homogeneous IPv6
deployments. Offering further evidence, the last column labeled
"EUI-64: Path Offset" explores the distribution hop positions for
EUI-64 interface addresses, as a negative offset from end of path.
In all CDN campaigns, we see the 5th percentile and median are
0, meaning 95% of their EUI-64 addresses are the last hop on path.
For the TUM campaigns, 50% of their EUI-64 addresses are the last
hop on path (median is 0) while 95% are one of the last 3 hops (5th
percentile is -3). This topological difference is presumably the result
of increased heterogeneity of TUM versus CDN targets.
It is not a coincidence that these two target sets also have highest
overall yield and highest yield of exclusive interface addresses (as
seen in the “Excl Int Addrs” column). This is due, in large part, to
elicited ICMPv6 responses from these CPE routers, one target set
yielding one manufacturer’s routers in one ISP’s, and the other ISP
containing a different router manufacturer.
IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA R. Beverly et al.
Table 7: Results of aggregate Yarrp campaigns run from three vantages, reverse sorted by IntAddrs yield, i.e., sources of ICMPv6
Time-Exceeded messages. Path Offset of EUI-64 Int Addrs is relative to Path Len, 0 being the last Hop Addr on path.
Yarrp6 Agg Traces Target
Rtr Excl Int Excl Int Excl Reach Path Len EUI-64: Path Offset
Campaign Addrs Int Int BGP Int ASNs Int Target 95th Perc. Int 5th Perc.Addrs Addrs Pfxs BGP ASNs ASN (Median) Addrs (Median)
ALL both 45.8M 12.6M 1.4M 0 9.9k 0 7.1k 0 40% 20 (11) 651.4k 45% -7 (0)
EU-NET both 15.0M 12.2M 1.3M 136.0k 9.5k 236 6.9k 110 44% 17 (8) 613.0k 48% -11 (0)
US-EDU-1 both 15.4M 12.6M 1.3M 84.9k 9.4k 75 6.8k 31 43% 19 (10) 602.7k 48% -9 (0)
US-EDU-2 both 15.4M 12.6M 881.4k 20.7k 7.4k 148 5.5k 76 33% 21 (15) 540.6k 61% -2 (0)
cdn k32 z64 9.6M 3.2M 756.6k 534.2k 2.0k 33 1.2k 8 52% 18 (12) 297.2k 39% 0 (0)
tum z64 6.2M 2.1M 582.4k 364.7k 7.9k 98 6.0k 58 63% 19 (12) 311.2k 53% -3 (0)
cdn k32 z48 1.6M 524.2k 203.7k 9.6k 1.8k 4 1.2k 2 70% 19 (12) 79.8k 39% 0 (0)
fdns z64 2.2M 746.9k 185.2k 9.4k 6.2k 5 5.0k 2 48% 19 (10) 15.4k 8% -1 (0)
dnsdb z64 698.6k 233.0k 154.0k 23.2k 7.8k 176 6.0k 106 55% 20 (13) 10.1k 7% -5 (0)
6gen z64 13.4M 4.5M 126.4k 46.9k 7.1k 174 5.2k 58 27% 31 (12) 24.8k 20% -18 (0)
tum z48 1.1M 362.7k 118.3k 2.1k 6.6k 6 5.0k 2 41% 18 (9) 11.6k 10% -3 (0)
cdn k256 z64 1.2M 396.7k 116.9k 3.4k 1.2k 0 639 0 51% 18 (11) 28.5k 24% 0 (0)
cdn k256 z48 487.1k 162.4k 89.7k 428 1.1k 0 637 0 69% 18 (12) 19.5k 22% 0 (0)
fdns z48 673.3k 228.7k 88.5k 551 4.8k 0 4.0k 0 29% 18 (6) 4.2k 5% -8 (0)
dnsdb z48 281.3k 93.8k 87.9k 662 6.4k 4 5.0k 1 49% 21 (12) 5.5k 6% -7 (0)
6gen z48 4.3M 1.4M 69.4k 2.0k 6.5k 40 4.9k 25 16% 32 (12) 3.5k 5% -19 (-3)
caida z64 314.7k 105.2k 60.9k 398 6.3k 11 4.8k 5 26% 31 (12) 428 1% -20 (-4)
caida z48 234.3k 78.3k 57.7k 92 6.1k 2 4.7k 1 25% 29 (12) 370 1% -20 (-3)
fiebig z64 2.8M 1.0M 54.2k 9.6k 3.3k 57 2.8k 49 24% 17 (5) 1.3k 2% -15 (-3)
fiebig z48 270.3k 102.2k 22.1k 63 2.7k 0 2.3k 0 11% 17 (4) 177 1% -17 (-2)
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Figure 6: Selected Result Features of Yarrp Campaigns (cor-
responding to Table 7).
5.2 Target Sets Power
Central to our study is evaluating trace target strategies to not
only maximize topological discovery, but also efficiency within
an address space too large to be exhaustively probed. In Figure 7,
we examine the relationship between each z64 target set’s count
of interface addresses discovered via probing from the EU-NET
vantage point, and the number of probe packets required.2 We
observe qualitatively similar results from the other vantage points,
and choose to focus on the EU-NET results due to space constraints.
2Equivalently, at a fixed probing rate, this plot shows discovery as a function of time.
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Figure 7: Address discovery power per z64 target set vs.
probe packets emitted (from EU-NET vantage in Table 7).
The current state-of-the-art strategy, employed by both CAIDA
and RIPE for their production IPv6 mapping, of tracing to the ::1
address (plus a random address in CAIDA’s case) within routed
IPv6 BGP prefixes performs best in the initial stages of the probing,
but suffers a noticeable flattening in discovery past 300k packets
(note the log-log plot scale). CAIDA’s discovery peaks at fewer
than 100k interfaces after ≈2M probes as it exhausts the target set.
This dichotomy of performing well initially, but falling well short
of the absolute number of interfaces discovered via other target
sets, illustrates that this BGP-based strategy provides breadth, but
lacks the specificity to discover IPv6 subnetting where significant
topology exists in depth.
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As a second baseline of a BGP-informed strategy, we probe ran-
domly generated IPv6 addresses that are routable. Unsurprisingly,
this unguided target selection performs poorly with a precipitous
drop in newly discovered interfaces after ∼1M probes. However,
random outperforms Fiebig prior to this point, largely due to its
high degree of clustering (evident in the DPL of Figure 3). Similarly,
the 6gen target set provides a high interface yield at the onset of
probing, but flattens past 1M probes. In fact, the shape of the 6gen
curve closely mirrors random, but with a fixed positive offset.
In contrast, the overall discovery rate is higher and linear for
the tum and cdn-k32 synthesized target lists, implying that these
provide the most power. Although they have similar discovery
yields, cdn-k32 finds ∼200k more addresses from this vantage.
5.3 Validation
As with similar Internet-wide active measurement studies, valida-
tion of our method is complicated by limited availability of ground
truth and by limited seed address collections, in part, both due
to privacy concerns. To place our results in context, we therefore
consider our discovered IPv6 topologies relative to those available
from production IPv6 active traceroute systems, namely CAIDA’s
Ark [11] and RIPE Atlas [52]. For both, we gather the complete set
of traceroute results for May 18, 2018 available from each vantage
point. Both Ark and Atlas are global platforms, with vantages in
different regions and networks. While Ark had 65 IPv6-capable
vantages at the time of writing, Atlas had 4,333.
Within the 24 hour period, Atlas probed 34.3k unique targets
and discovered 103.8k unique interfaces, while Ark issued traces to
349k targets which revealed 126.8k interfaces. Notably, while Ark
used 6.9M traces, our methodology discovers ∼1.3M interfaces –
an order of magnitude more – with only approximately twice the
number of traces.
We further compared our results to those of a proprietary prober
that regularly performs millions of traces per day [3]. With that
prober, the cdn-k32-z64-fixediid target set was traced sepa-
rately on May 3, 2018, i.e., emitting TTL-limited probes toward
active WWW client address space. In contrast to Yarrp6, this prober
is stateful, like traceroute, and operates by distributing its work-
load of traces across a set of machines, here, from one physical and
topological location to make comparison reasonable. Results show
the interface address yield difference was within 1.1%, and other
metrics were similar; it is plausible that vantage connectivity and
system resources are responsible for the difference.
Lastly, in Table 7, note there is some variation in Yarrp6 results
by vantage, despite launching the same campaigns. While EU-NET
and US-EDU-1 show similar yield, ∼1.3M interface addresses, US-
EDU-2 has lower yield, ∼881k, despite having performed just as
many traces. Our hypothesis is that this vantage is unusual in that
its on-premise path is longer (as seen in Figure 5b and median
path length in 7) and thus may warrant a higher TTL value (per
Section 4.2).
6 SUBNET DISCOVERY
Having collected voluminous trace results, we turn our attention to
topological inference from the results. We employ two techniques
to infer subnet boundaries. The first one is based on path divergence
observed in traces from prior work (with IPv4), while the second
relies on the ubiquitous delegating of /64 prefixes as the most-
specific subnets at the Internet’s periphery and thus is IPv6-specific.
Path divergence-based discovery. Inspired by Lee et al. [40],
we discover IPv6 subnets based on path divergence detected in the
paths traversed in our trace campaigns. However, IPv6 requires
different premises. First, our goal is to infer heterogeneous IPv6
prefixes by splitting subnets, starting with known BGP prefixes,
into smaller ones based on divergent hops; whereas subnets are
coalesced to identify homogeneous IPv4 prefixes in [40]. Next, there
is no canonical equivalent of /24 in IPv6 space due to the freedom
afforded network operators by generous address allotments and
many transition and feature-based address assignment options.
As in Lee’s work, the keys to the technique are twofold. First,
traced paths from one or more vantages to two different target
addresses are compared to (a) identify a significant converging
subpath (a substring, composed of router hop addresses, that is
common to both traced paths) and (b) identify a subsequent signifi-
cant diverging subpath. By “significant” we mean we are willing
to assume that the divergence, in context of the convergence prior,
indicates that the two addresses belong to different subnets. We
call the converging subpath by the name “last common subpath”
(LCS) and refer to the diverging path tails by the name “divergent
suffixes” (DS). The second key to the technique is that, once two
addresses are assumed to be in different prefixes, we calculate those
two addresses’ “discriminating prefix length” (DPL), introduced in
Section 3.4.1. Given that we take them to be in different subnets, we
know that the first n bits of each address, where n is the DPL, must
also be the first n bits of each subnet’s base address and, therefore,
the subnet’s prefix length must be at least n.
Our implementation, discoverByPathDiv, classifies sets of IPv6
traced paths as divergent (or not) according to these parameters:
• The LCS must have minimum length: c = 2.
• The LCS must have C hop(s) having an ASN matching the
target’s ASN: C = 1.
• Missing hop addresses are not allowed in the LCS.
• The last hop’s ASN must not match the vantage’s ASN: A = 1.
• The DS must have minimum length: s = 1.
• The DS must have S hop(s) whose ASN match the target’s:
S = 1.
• No DS can have zero length: z = 0.
• The target ASN for each path pair must match: T = 1.
In this way, our implementation (with these numerous parame-
ters) can be made restrictive about the paths it accepts as evidence
of significant path divergence and, therefore, conservative in subnet
discovery. We tested even more conservative parameter values, e.g.,
a higher DS minimum length s = 2, but path divergences ostensibly
due to traffic engineering and load-balancing occurred too near the
last hop, as reported also with IPv4 in prior works.
There are additional complications. For instance, (a) IPv6 net-
works exist that use many ASNs simultaneously, e.g., one origi-
nating routes to the BGP prefix(es) covering router addresses and
another originating routes for the prefix(es) covering their cus-
tomer’s (target) addresses. To avoid these failing to meet our path
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and target ASN requirements, we augment the BGP information
with collections of “equivalent” ASNs, identified by operational
experience and expert knowledge, e.g., of ISP acquisitions or merg-
ers, considering them equal even though they are distinct numbers.
Also, (b) since it is not necessary for networks to globally advertise
routes to prefixes covering their routers’ addresses (since routers
only need to communicate in LANs or point-to-point links to each
other), IPv6 networks also exist that use router addresses not cov-
ered in the BGP. To avoid having this violate our path and target
ASN requirements, we augment the BGP information with some
prefixes that are in Regional Internet Registries but not the global
BGP. This is especially important for IPv6 where a small number of
very large networks, e.g., Comcast and Charter Spectrum, respec-
tively, present these ASN and IP prefix record keeping challenges.
/64 Discovery. Our second subnet-related topology discovery
technique is a simpler one, specific to the IPv6 Internet which typi-
cally has /64 subnets at its edge. This scheme is very common since
it is required by popular IPv6 address assignment techniques such
as SLAAC (Stateless Address Auto-configuration) and SLAAC with
temporary privacy extensions (also known as “privacy addresses”)
in which every IPv6 host address has an interface identifier (IID)
comprising the low 64 bits and a network (subnet) identifier com-
prising the high 64 bits.
It is often the case that TTL-limited probes to some target address
never elicit an ICMP or ICMPv6 response with the target address
as its source. This leaves the analyst not knowing whether the
resulting path reached the router nearest the target or not, making it
hard to make assertions on even simple metrics like the diameter of
the Internet (as measured in router hops). To overcome this problem
of determining where exactly that last hop is in the topology, we
leverage the fact, learned from prior active measurement studies,
that many IPv6 routers have the IID value :0000:0000:0000:0001
(canonically displayed as ::1 with zero compression) in the source
address used to generate ICMPv6 error messages such as Time-
Exceeded [32], e.g., routers serving as the gateway for hosts having
address in the subnet for that LAN. Certainly not all IPv6 routers
do this, but it is common and is not unlike the practice with IPv4
of, e.g., using 192.168.0.1 as the router gateway address for the
192.168.0.0/24 subnet. Whenwe see a last hop ending in ::1 that
has the high 64-bits matching the target address, we assume that the
probe elicited a response from the gateway router for the target’s
LAN, and thus completed. This is a valuable inference in at least
two ways: (a) it allows us to assume this trace reached a unique /64
subnet and thus the target address must be in a different subnet than
another target address that, likewise, has a last hop in a different
/64 covering prefix, thereby enabling divergence-based discovery;
(b) it can help us infer reachability, access control, and firewalling
policies that limit results in active measurement campaigns, e.g., to
assess vulnerabilities or to discover topological characteristics.
We added this second technique to discoverByPathDiv and call
it the “Identity Association (IA) Hack” because it can be leveraged
to reverse-engineer the IP address identity (prefix) delegated to a
customer by an ISP. This is is an important capability for privacy-
minded Internet operation if we wish to guarantee some level of
anonymity in IP addresses [49]; we are pursuing this as future work.
Candidate Subnet Results.We refer to our results as “candi-
dates” because our method determines a lower bound on a subnet’s
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Figure 8: Subnets inferred by path divergence
prefix length. This bound is set based on the highest DPL of a tar-
get address ostensibly within the subnet and another ostensibly
without, i.e., where the traces show paths to those targets diverged.
Thus, a candidate subnet length means that we’ve discovered a
subnet having a prefix length of at least that reported.
Examining the combination of all 45.8M traces for path diver-
gences, we discovered 172,497 candidate subnets, covered by 1,726
BGP prefixes having 1,013 origin ASNs. Figure 8a plots the CDF
of those subnets for each target set. This figure shows that target
sets power to discover candidate subnets is largely governed by
their respective addresses’ DPLs plotted in Figure 3a. Also note
that, although we see improved potential power of the target sets
in combination (Figure 3b), that improved power is not realized
here: the CDFs do not shift right. This may be due to active mea-
surement difficulties, e.g., missing hops on traced paths and our
conservative approach which does not allow missing hops on the
common subpath before divergence.
Figure 8b plots counts of discovered subnets by prefix length
per target set and combined. Note there are a few prominences
suggesting popular prefix lengths (subnet sizes). Also note that,
while some target sets help to discover only subnets less than a
particular length, e.g., 59 (cdn-k32) or 55 (cdn-k256), others can
help to discover more specific subnets because they contain unag-
gregated, active /64 prefixes, e.g., from the DNS. The dots plotted
directly above 64 on the horizontal axis in Figure 8b are the counts
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where the last hop address was covered by the same /64 prefix
as the target address, i.e., the IA Hack. (Combined these total to
1,284,891.)
SubnetValidation.To evaluate these results, first we use ground
truth data consisting of a set of 12,447 interior prefixes of major
US ISP networks (109 BGP prefixes advertised by 30 origin ASNs)
and their respective city-level locations and assume those in dif-
ferent cities are also topologically heterogeneous, i.e., in different
subnets such that our method should be able to ascertain, if it is
given sufficient traces to target addresses in and near those subnets.
We find, that we’ve performed 386,579 traces from each vantage
to target addresses covered by 5,839 (47%) of the subnets in truth
data. Of those, our algorithm discovered 109 subnets exactly as
in the truth data, i.e., having the same base addresses and prefix
lengths: 107 /40 prefixes and 2 /64 prefixes. However, because these
ground truth subnets are intermediate (in between advertised BGP
prefixes and LAN subnets) or “distribution” subnets, we shouldn’t
expect many exact matches as our method may have discovered
more-specific subnets. Indeed we find that we’ve discovered more
specific candidates within 3,871 (66%) of those ground truth prefixes.
To deal with this complication, we re-run our algorithm on a
subset of traces selected by stratified sampling, i.e., we choose only
one trace to one target address in each ground truth subnet. This
intentionally reduces the fidelity of our technique by lowering the
target addresses’ DPLs, thus limiting discovery to subnets no more-
specific than those in the truth data. With this sampled subset
of traces our algorithm yields 914 candidate subnets (18%), 395
(43%) of which exactly match the truth data. Of the non-matching
results, 52% have a prefix length that is one bit short and 20% are
short by two. Improving this prefix length approximation by lower
bound necessitates additional traces to targets with higher DPL. As
such, we merely claim these discovered subnet results are plausible
based on modest coincidence with ground truth and that stratified
sampling is a possible way the technique can be tuned to discover
hierarchical subnets.
Attempting to further evaluate subnet discovery results, we ex-
amine two universities’ subnet address plans that were shared pub-
licly. For both universities, the entirety of each of their active IPv6
address spaces is covered by just one subnet in our results, having
prefix lengths of 41 and 39, respectively. Investigation shows that
the anonymization method employed [49], e.g., for cdn-k32, kept
us from probing targets in these networks ostensibly having too
few simultaneously active IPv6 WWW clients. That is, for privacy
reasons, no target addresses with sufficiently high DPL were probed
to discern more-specific subnets.
7 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we seek to advance the state-of-the-art in Internet-
wide IPv6 active topology mapping. We collect seeds and synthesize
targets from a number of sources using a three-step process. Next,
to facilitate large-scale IPv6 topology mapping, we emit traceroutes
from three vantage points to the targets using a modified version
of Yarrp (Yarrp6). Along the way, we investigate the use of vari-
ous target selection methods and parameters (e.g., maximum TTL,
probing speed, etc.) that elicit the most IPv6 topological informa-
tion. Our investigations provide breadth across networks, depth
to discover subnetting, and speed. More specifically, we discover
over 1.3M IPv6 interface addresses, which is an order of magnitude
more compared to the state-of-the-art mapping systems.
7.1 Security & Privacy
Our results led us to consider security concerns specific to IPv6
topology mapping. Due in part to the address length, IPv6 ad-
dresses can contain sensitive information that makes the active
IPv6 address space easier to scan or probe, and likely more vulner-
able to malicious exploits [29]. For example, our probe campaigns
elicited ICMPv6 “Time Exceeded” responses from many sources
having IEEE MAC-based EUI-64 addresses. These IIDs ostensibly
embed Ethernet addresses, exposing the manufacturer or model of a
router [45] , and, perhaps, its operating system. RFC 7721 [14] notes
that these IEEE-identifier-based IIDs make attacks possible, e.g.,
address scanning and device exploits. Likewise, we received “Time
Exceeded” messages from many addresses covered by the same /64
prefix as a target address, i.e., routers ostensibly collocated, e.g.,
in a LAN, with hosts. The community should carefully consider
the implications of these router-addressing practices as a router’s
source address, e.g., when sending ICMPv6 error messages, can
disclose details that users may prefer to remain private.
Therefore, we release datasets with restrictions. The public data,
available at [7], contains seeds and targets. The complete data and
results will be available to researchers at [19] with restricted dis-
tribution. However, we note that our methodology is reproducible
using publicly-available seed datasets and freely-available probe
utilities. The resulting addresses and subnets discovered or inferred
likely extend the attack surface already discernible via hitlists.
7.2 Future Work
Based on these encouraging results, we plan to leverage our method-
ology across a large number of vantages and time to provide even
greater scope and coverage. Further, we plan to perform alias reso-
lution, e.g., [42], to produce router-level topologies and facilitate
comparative graph analyses between IPv4 and IPv6.
Finally, our subnet discovery results show that it is sometimes
feasible to remotely determine likely IPv6 prefix assigned to a single
user or subscriber. In DHCPv6 prefix delegation this is referred to as
Identity Association (IA), and prefix lengths can vary according to
the services offered and hints offered by a router to which a prefix is
delegated, e.g., on the customer premises. We plan to run additional
measurement campaigns to comprehensively assess this capability,
with the hope that it might inform IP address anonymization by
aggregation, to provide a known level of client privacy.
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